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Abstract 
We investigate the pattern of corporate financing through bank loans, bond markets and 
stock markets in the European Union (EU).  Specifically, we examine whether the 
European economies are converging towards a market-oriented or a bank-oriented 
financial system. Panel unit root tests and GMM regressions are applied to flow of funds 
data for eight EU countries over the period 1972- 2004. We find that the pattern of 
corporate financing in the EU mimics elements of the pecking order theory of financing 
choices.  Furthermore, the EU financial system seems to be converging on a variant of 
the Anglo-Saxon model, with heavy reliance on internal financing and financing from the 
capital market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main objectives behind the formation of the European Union (EU) is 
attainment of financial integration among member countries. Greater financial integration 
is expected to facilitate financial sector efficiency, macroeconomic stability and effective 
implementation of monetary policy in the EU (Trichet, 2005). While several studies have 
examined the degree of financial integration in the EU,
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 we turn our attention to the issue 
of financial convergence. This paper attempts to investigate convergence in corporate 
financing patterns and thereby provide insights into a different aspect of EU integration. 
In this respect, the paper extends the work of Murinde et al. (2004), which tested for 
convergence in corporate financing patterns in the EU during 1972-1996, by using more 
recent data for 1972-2004 and by studying a slightly larger set of EU countries, namely 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
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 In 
addition, this study invokes more appropriate econometric techniques by using modern 
panel unit root tests (introduced by Evans and Karras, 1996), and further by employing a 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) methodology suited for testing convergence in 
panel data (following Islam, 1995 and Nerlove, 1996).  
 The pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) is the most popular 
theoretical explanation for capital structure choice in non-financial firms. However 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) point out that there is no theoretical framework that can 
explain cross-country differences in capital structure. While theoretical papers derive 
different optimal contracts as solutions to the managerial incentive problem, the issue of 
why managerial incentives differ has been empirically examined by several authors. For 
instance, La Porta et al. (1997) show that differences in legal environments can affect the 
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nature of firm financing. Berglof and Claessens (2004) argue that enforcement of 
corporate governance mechanisms affects firms seeking external financing. We believe 
that as the member countries of the EU move towards financial integration through 
harmonization of institutions, this would engender a level playing field for firms in terms 
of their external financing choices. Indeed Baele et al. (2004) have shown that EU 
countries have made considerable progress in setting up of common rules in financial 
markets and providing equal access to financial instruments or services in these markets. 
As a result we expect the corporate financing patterns of non-financial firms in these 
countries to converge. 
In a previous study, Murinde et al. (2004) found little evidence of convergence in 
EU countries in terms of bank and bond financing and some evidence of convergence in 
equity and internal financing with strong growth in the latter which was in line with 
previous findings (Bertero, 1994; Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996). Our extended sample, as 
summarized in Figure 1, indicates that the EU has continued to witness convergence in 
corporate financing with a clear shift from bank financing towards market based 
financing. The graphs suggest an ongoing switch from bank to equity and bond debt 
finance and indicate that internal finance is no longer growing strongly. In this paper we 
undertake formal empirical testing to confirm the above convergence. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Mullineux (2007a, 2007b) inter alia examines the trends in financial sector 
convergence, postulating the evolution of a hybrid model in which financial 
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conglomerates have evolved in the US and Japan similar to the prevailing European 
universal banking and bancassurance models. And capital markets have become more 
important in Europe and Japan, leading to some catch up with the US (and the UK).  The 
euro denominated corporate bond market has grown rapidly, since the introduction of the 
euro in 1999 and overtaken the US dollar denominated market in the middle of the 
subsequent decade. Our findings confirm the growth in corporate bond financing and 
suggest that it is at the expense of bank financing. A similar disintermediation involving a 
switch by large corporates (but not bank dependent SMEs) from bank loan to bond (and 
shorter term rate and commercial paper) finance has been seen in Japan and the US. 
However our data set pertains to firms of all size classes since the disaggregated data by 
asset size was not available.  
 More generally, financial sector integration is being encouraged in the EU as a 
way of improving financial service provision, deepening markets and reducing the cost of 
capital, including the cost of payments and settlement. The introduction of the euro in 
1999, aimed to facilitate this process, along with the Financial Services Act Plan (FSAP) 
adopted by the European Council in March 2000. Thirty eight of its forty two members 
had been widely adopted by the end of 2004. There is some concern about the continuing 
high costs of cross-border payments, but the EC is pressing for a single European 
Payment Area (SEPA) to be completed before the end of the decade. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) is seeking permission to launch a Europe-wide system itself, as a 
means of bypassing the obstacles.  It should be noted that the FSAP and SEPA cover 
retail banking initiatives as well as corporate finance (cost of capital and money and 
capital market liquidity) issues.  
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 The development of a single European financial market, to the extent that remains 
possible under globalization, also has implications for the conduct of monetary policy 
(Trichet, 2005). Changes in interest rates now have more similar effects in the various 
parts of the EU. Harmonisation of home loan markets may reduce financial instability 
and lower costs of capital may increase investment and growth. Therefore, financial 
integration in the EU can be expected to boost economic growth and aid financial 
stability. In this context, the issue of whether financial systems across EU countries are 
converging becomes important. Our work is focused on a particular aspect of financial 
convergence, viz. financing patterns. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of empirical modeling of convergence. Section 3 presents the results from panel 
unit root tests of convergence followed by the results from GMM regressions in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. MODELING CONVERGENCE 
Bulk of the literature on convergence can be traced back to Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) who developed regression based tests for growth convergence. Subsequent 
developments in the convergence literature have proceeded in two broad directions. The 
first is the approach of Evans and Karras (1996) who developed a formal test of 
convergence that is based on panel unit root tests. The second is the work by Islam 
(1995) and Nerlove (1996) who extended the Barro and Salai-i-Martin framework to 
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allow for testing of convergence in a panel framework. We conduct both the above types 
of tests in this paper and hence provide a brief overview of each. 
 
2.1 UNIT ROOT AND STATIONARITY TESTS OF CONVERGENCE 
While the classical growth regression approach is quite popular in the literature, it has 
faced criticism on account of ignoring time-series properties of the data. Evans (1996) 
recommended exploiting both the time-series and the cross-section information provided 
by panel data in order to evaluate the convergence hypothesis. Evans and Karras (1996) 
showed that, economies can be said to converge if and only if there exists a common 
trend in output yit (logarithm of output per worker in economy i during period t) such that 
Et (yn,t+1 – at+1 ) = n, where at is the common trend and n is a constant. Evans and Karras 
(1996) posited this question as a test of stationarity of the mean-differenced series, zit = 
yn,t+i – ity  . In this paper we replace yit with the relevant corporate financing variable viz. 
bank financing (BANK), equity financing (EQUITY), bond financing (BOND) and 
internal financing (INTERN) respectively for non-financial firms in the EU where we 
consider the share of each mode of financing in total financing as the relevant 
endogenous variable, yit (the data are described in details later).  
 To ascertain stationarity of the mean-differenced data, we conduct five panel unit 
root tests and two stationarity tests which we briefly describe here. For conducting the 
panel unit root tests of the mean-differenced data, we first use the test given by Levin, 
Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002). This is essentially a pooled Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test but is general enough to allow for individual fixed effects as well as time effects in 
the data. Next we employ Breitung‟s (2000) test which is similar to LLC expect for the 
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way in which it uses proxies to estimate the auto-regressive coefficients. However the 
major limitation of these tests is that each cross-section in the panel is assumed to share 
the same auto-regressive coefficient. Thus rejection of the null of non-stationarity implies 
that the rate of convergence is same across all units. This assumed homogeneity of the 
unit root was overcome by Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 1997; 2003) who estimated 
individual-specific ADF tests and then computed the mean of the different t-statistics. 
Thus, the IPS test does not assume that all series are stationary under the alternative, but 
is consistent under the alternative that only some of the series are stationary. Therefore, 
we employ the IPS test as a robust means of testing our convergence hypothesis. We also 
use the Fisher-ADF test and the Fisher-PP test (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001). The 
Fisher tests are similar to the IPS test in the sense that they combine independent unit root 
tests (conducted as chi-square tests in this case) of the individual series.  
 Finally, we apply a stationarity test, viz. the Hadri test (Hadri, 2000) which is a 
residual based Lagrange multiplier test with the null hypothesis of stationarity of the 
series. This test has high power and has the advantage of being robust to non-normality. 
We also provide results from a variant of the Hadri test that is heteroscedasticity 
consistent. In sum, we choose to consider such a large variety of tests because each of 
them has its own relative advantages and we are able to arrive at a balanced conclusion 
by considering all the tests. This helps us to obtain robust results for unconditional 
convergence in corporate financing patterns. 
 
2.2 TESTS OF CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE USING GMM REGRESSIONS 
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The previous framework provides only an examination of unconditional convergence 
where different initial conditions among the countries cannot be controlled for. The 
classical growth regression approach of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) allows testing for 
conditional as well as unconditional convergence of countries based on their GDP per 
capita. The classical framework was based on cross-section data but was later extended 
by Islam (1995) and Nerlove (1996) to fit panel data. Islam (1995) shows that the 
classical model can be modified to form the following estimable expression based on 
panel data: 
itiititit uxyy   
/
1         (1) 
where t=1 to T, represents year and i=1 to N represents country; yit stands for GDP per 
capita for country i in year t; xit stands for all the determinants of growth; it represents 
the country-specific effects; and uit is white noise. In the above expression, if the 
estimated  turns out to be less than one, then we can deduce that there is convergence 
across the units and over the time period considered. Moreover, the inverse of  indicates 
the speed of convergence. 
 In this paper, our objective is to adopt the above framework for testing 
convergence in growth rates of corporate financing patterns of EU countries. In what 
follows we explain how we adopt the growth regression framework to the context of 
corporate financing. The flow of funds data that we use decomposes the aggregate 
economic activity of a country to the flow of funds in the government, private, household 
and financial sectors. Therefore, a convergence in national economic growths
3
 does not 
automatically imply that there will be convergence in each of the disaggregated sectors of 
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the economies. This motivates the modeling of convergence in a disaggregated 
component of the aggregate economies, i.e. the financial sector in our case. Analogous to 
the neo-classical production function that is typically assumed for the macro-economy, 
we conceptualise the economic activity in the financial sector in terms of corporate 
financing being produced by employing different inputs such as those implied by 
monetary policy and other control variables (Murinde et al., 2004). Therefore, we replace 
GDP per capita in the traditional growth model by the types of corporate financing. In 
other words, in equation (1) we replace yit by the share of corporate financing from a 
particular source. Consequently, we are able to test for convergence among EU countries 
in terms of their corporate financing patterns. 
 However the main problem with the model outlined in equation (1) is that the 
lagged dependent variable yit-1 and the country-specific effects it are correlated, which 
means that the usual panel estimators are biased and inconsistent. The Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) methodology is a convenient means of estimating this 
model where instrument variables are used for yit-1 and moment conditions are exploited 
in the estimation (Hansen, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991). In this paper we follow 
Arellano and Bover‟s (1995) methodology of orthogonal deviation that removes the 
unobserved country-specific effects. The orthogonal deviation transformation expresses 
each observation as the deviation from the mean of future observations for the same 
country and it weights each deviation to standardize the variance. The advantage of using 
this transformation is that the transformed errors will be serially uncorrelated and 
homoskedastic.  
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 We apply the above methodology to estimate four different equations. First, we 
estimate the convergence model for bank financing based on the following equation: 
ititititititit uOPENIRERBMYBANKBANK   43211    (2) 
where BANK is bank financing by non-financial companies (NFCs), BMY is the ratio of 
money supply to GDP, ER is the nominal exchange rate, IR is the nominal interest rate 
and OPEN is a measures of the degree of openness calculated as the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP. While the control variables BMY and IR are proxies for monetary 
policy and are consistent with the idea of monetary convergence as stipulated by the 
European Commission (Murinde et al., 2004), ER and OPEN are expected to control for 
the influence of trade policy and terms of trade on corporate financing.   
 The second equation that we estimate is based on the role of equity markets in 
providing finance to NFCs: 
ititititititit uOPENIRERBMYEQUITYEQUITY   43211    (3) 
where EQUITY is equity financing by the NFCs and the control variables are the same as 
before. We also estimate an equation based on bond financing of NFCs: 
ititititititit uOPENIRERBMYBONDBOND   43211    (4) 
where BOND is bond financing by the NFCs and the control variables are the same as 
before. Finally, we test convergence in the use of internal finance by NFCs by estimating 
the following equation: 
ititititititit uOPENIRERBMYINTERNINTERN   43211    (5) 
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where INTERN is internal financing by the NFCs and the control variables are the same 
as before. 
 The data for this study are taken from the OECD flow-of-funds tables and covers 
the period 1972-2004 for eight EU member countries, viz. Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. We define the endogenous variables 
i.e. the corporate financing variables as percentages of total, e.g. BANKit refers to the 
percentage of bank borrowing by NFCs in country i in year t out of total financing. The 
data on macroeconomic variables are collected from IMF‟s International Financial 
Statistics database. Mean values of the corporate finance data are plotted in figure 1. As 
mentioned earlier, the evolving patterns provide preliminary indication of a shift from 
bank based financing to market sources. Table 1 presents a correlation matrix of all the 
main variables that we study.  
 
3. RESULTS FROM PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Panel unit root and stationarity tests have the advantage that they take account of time-
series properties of the variables while examining convergence. Thus we employ a 
variety of such tests for examining convergence in corporate financing in the EU. We 
conduct five panel unit root tests and two panel stationarity tests on each corporate 
financing variable and the results for all the eight countries in our sample are presented in 
Table 2. We find that for bank financing the results are overwhelmingly in favour of 
convergence as the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the data gets rejected by all the 
five unit root tests (albeit marginally for the LLC test at the level of 10%). Furthermore, 
the Hadri tests of stationarity do not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity. However 
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for equity financing, the results do not indicate convergence. Although the Fisher-PP test 
rejects the null hypothesis, however the rest of the tests do not provide evidence to 
suggest a convergence in equity financing among the sample countries.  
 
   [Table 2 about here] 
 
The bond financing results are in favour of convergence as indicated by the 
unanimous rejection of the null hypothesis in all the unit root tests. It may be noted that 
although the Hadri test rejects the null hypothesis of stationarity at the 10% level, the 
heteroscedasticy consistent version of the test provides evidence for convergence. The 
results for internal finance are not entirely unanimous. While the LLC test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, the Fisher-PP test rejects it only at the 10% level 
of significance. However all the other tests provide results to indicate convergence in 
internal financing. In sum, the above tests strongly indicate that there has been 
convergence in the corporate financing patterns of the EU countries in terms of bank and 
bond financing. Our results provide weak evidence in favour of convergence in terms of 
equity and internal financing.
4
  
 We also conduct the panel unit root tests for only the countries that have adopted 
euro as their currency (i.e. excluding Sweden and the UK). The results are presented in 
the Appendix Table A1. The results are almost similar to those obtained for the full 
sample, except for mixed results in the case of equity financing. Hence, the convergence 
hypothesis appears to hold for bank finance and bond finance whereas the results are 
mixed for equity finance and internal finance (the Hadri tests of stationarity indicate 
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convergence whereas the unit root tests do not). These results reinforce our earlier 
findings for the EU countries. Hence, our results strongly suggest that NFCs in euro 
countries have converged in terms of their bank and bond financing patterns, whereas the 
results for equity and internal finance are mixed. Finally we conduct the panel unit root 
tests on our sample only for the countries that were EU members from the beginning of 
our data period, i.e. 1972. Hence, we leave out the new entrants, viz. Finland, Spain and 
Sweden, from our sample. The results are presented in the Appendix Table A2. These 
results suggest that these countries exhibited convergence in terms of bank finance and 
bond finance, thereby re-affirming our previous results.  
 To summarize, our panel unit root tests indicate that the EU countries have 
exhibited convergence in their corporate financing patterns in terms of their bank 
financing and equity financing. This pattern of convergence has been consistent across 
the countries that have adopted the euro as their currency as well as for the founder EU 
member countries. 
 
4. RESULTS FROM GMM REGRESSIONS 
While the above tests examined financial convergence only in an unconditional sense, we 
now move to the formal testing for convergence based on the modification of the 
classical regression approach as outlined in equations (2) to (5). These set of regressions, 
based on the dynamic panel GMM methodology, allow us to assess unconditional as well 
as conditional convergence. The results of the estimation of equations (2) to (5) all the 
eight countries in our sample are presented in Table 3. The coefficients of the lagged 
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financing variables are less than one in all cases except for internal financing. This 
indicates that there has been convergence in corporate financing patterns in terms of 
bank, equity and bond financing across the eight countries in our sample over the period 
1972-2004. However, the speed of convergence varies across the source of finance. 
Considering un-conditional convergence, bond finance appears to have exhibited the 
quickest convergence followed by equity and bank finance in that order. This pattern is 
repeated even when factors affecting financial convergence are controlled for, i.e. in the 
case of conditional convergence once again it is bond finance that exhibits the fastest 
convergence followed by equity and bank finance in that order. Our results indicating 
slow convergence of bank finance are comparable with the results of Murinde et al. 
(2004) who observed a lack of convergence in financing from this source.  
 
   [Table 3 about here] 
 
Therefore, based on a more recent and expanded dataset, we observe that the EU 
countries have begun to converge in terms of the use of bank financing by NFCs, 
although the speed of convergence is the slowest for this source of finance. Another 
interesting finding is that EU countries exhibit convergence in bond financing and in fact 
this variable shows the fastest conditional as well as unconditional convergence, whereas 
Murinde et al. (2004) did not observe any convergence in financing from this source. 
This indicates that in recent years, NFCs in European countries have shown a tendency to 
source similar proportions of their total financing requirements from the bond markets. 
Our GMM results indicate convergence in equity financing whereas the panel unit root 
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tests did not suggest convergence in this source of financing. These are not necessarily 
conflicting since the GMM results indicate conditional convergence whereas the unit root 
tests examined unconditional convergence. Hence, our results suggest that while EU 
countries did not exhibit a common trend in terms of equity financing, there was 
conditional convergence in the sense suggested by the growth regression approach, i.e. 
countries with lower initial levels of equity financing exhibited higher growth in 
financing from this source (i.e. a catch-up effect). 
 The role played by introduction of the euro in 1999 in the patterns of corporate 
financing is examined by including a dummy variable (EURODUM) for the year 1999 in 
the above specifications.
5
 For the bank finance models, the results for the impact of the 
introduction of the euro suggests that while there has been convergence in bank 
financing, the introduction of the euro has actually led to an increase in dependence on 
bank borrowings. Similarly, the coefficient of the dummy variable is positive and 
significant in all cases of the equity financing and bond financing models suggesting that 
NFCs in the European countries increased their financing from equity issues and bond 
markets subsequent to the introduction of the Euro. However the introduction of the euro 
appears to have reduced the dependence on internal financing. These results indicate a 
convergence towards a variant of the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate financing 
characterized by increased importance of market based sources of finance and reduced 
role of internal finances in providing funds to the NFCs.  
 Whether entry of a country into the EU mattered in terms of the patterns of 
corporate financing is examined by including a dummy variable (ENTRYDUM) for the 
years of EU entry in the above specifications. While the results for the bank finance, 
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bond finance and internal finance models do not show any impact of entry, the coefficient 
of the dummy variable is negative and significant in almost all specifications of the 
equity finance models. These results indicate that entry into the EU was characterized by 
NFCs of member countries reducing their dependence on equity financing.  
 We also re-estimate the model specifications only for the countries that have 
adopted the euro thus leaving out Sweden and UK in these set of estimations. The results 
from these estimations are reported in Table 4. The results are almost the same as 
obtained for the entire sample earlier. Hence, the euro countries have exhibited both 
unconditional and conditional convergence in their corporate financing patterns. Bond 
finance appears to have exhibited the quickest convergence, in this case followed by bank 
finance and equity finance in that order. 
 
   [Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
We then re-estimate the model specifications only for the countries that were EU 
members from the beginning of our data period, i.e. we leave out Finland, Spain and 
Sweden, from our sample. See Table 5. Once again we observe that there has been 
convergence in corporate financing patterns across this sample of countries, including 
internal financing in this case. Considering un-conditional or conditional convergence, 
bond finance appears to have exhibited the quickest convergence followed by equity 
finance, bank finance and internal finance in that order.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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Recent studies, based on micro as well as macro level approaches have shown that the 
EU is undergoing financial integration (Baele et al., 2004; Gaspar et al., 2003; Kiehlborn 
and Mietzner, 2005). In this context, the present paper examines a particular aspect of the 
financial integration process, namely corporate financing patterns. We examine 
convergence in the corporate financing patterns of European countries during the period 
1972 to 2004. Employing a number of modern panel unit root tests, we find evidence for 
convergence in bank and bond finance, but we do not obtain unanimous results for equity 
finance and internal finance. We then apply the dynamic panel variant of the traditional 
growth regression approach.  
 Our results suggest that NFCs in Europe are converging in terms of the proportion 
of funds they access from banks, equity issues and bond markets. In sum, it appears that 
financial integration in EU has been characterized by NFCs increasingly taking recourse 
to bond and equity markets for their financing needs. Hence to some extent this indicates 
a move from bank-based financing to the Anglo-Saxon mode of market based financing. 
Whether this has also been accompanied by a shared reduction in internal financing is 
however not consistently borne out by our results.  
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Figure 1: Evolving corporate financing patterns in the EU 
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Note: Mean values are plotted for each year. Leverage refers to the ratio of debt (bank+bond) 
financing to equity financing; bank to market financing ratio refers to the ratio of bank financing 
to market (equity+bond) financing. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix of corporate financing and macroeconomic variables for eight 
EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK EQUITY BOND INTERN BMY ER IR OPEN 
BANK 1.000        
EQUITY 0.360 1.000       
BOND 0.293 0.634 1.000      
INTERN -0.866 -0.770 -0.606 1.000     
BMY -0.076 0.113 0.204 -0.025 1.000    
ER -0.054 -0.149 -0.143 0.121 -0.150 1.000   
IR 0.232 0.028 0.008 -0.168 -0.110 -0.179 1.000  
OPEN -0.125 -0.270 -0.179 0.228 -0.212 0.203 -0.429 1.000 
 
Note: BANK is bank financing by the NFCs to total financing, EQUITY is equity financing by 
NFCs to total financing, BOND is bond financing by NFCs to total financing, INTERN is internal 
financing by NFCs to total financing, BMY is the ratio of money supply to GDP, ER is the 
nominal exchange rate, IR is the nominal interest rate and OPEN is the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP 
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Table 2: Panel unit root and stationarity tests: Results for eight EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK EQUITY BOND INTERN 
Method Statistic 
P-
value Statistic 
P-
value Statistic 
P-
value Statistic 
P-
value 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)          
Levin, Lin & Chu -1.39695  0.0812  0.27109  0.6068 -8.12964  0.0000 -1.10692  0.1342 
Breitung t-stat -4.16643  0.0000 -1.16491  0.1220 -4.20111  0.0000 -2.28877  0.0110 
                  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)          
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  -3.40697  0.0003 -0.39352  0.3470 -7.77701  0.0000 -2.10592  0.0176 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square  41.5028  0.0005  16.5072  0.4182  86.8901  0.0000  26.3358  0.0495 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square  32.8367  0.0078  26.7665  0.0442  67.7155  0.0000  23.5700  0.0993 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)          
Hadri Z-stat  0.84747  0.1984  0.47226  0.3184  1.42700  0.0768  2.08913  0.0183 
Hadri 
Heteroscedasticity 
Consistent Z-stat  0.90051  0.1839  1.09923  0.1358  1.03987  0.1492  0.71894  0.2361 
                  
 
Note: The regression for the unit root tests follows from Evans and Karras (1996): 
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where zit is the mean differenced endogenous variable for corporate financing measured as bank 
financing, equity financing, bond financing and internal financing by NFCs as a ratio of total 
financing. We employ a variety of modern panel unit root tests based on the above formulation. 
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other 
tests assume asymptotic normality.  
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Table 3: GMM estimation results for eight EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK(-1) EQUITY(-1) BOND(-1) INTERN(-1) BMY ER IR OPEN EURODUM ENTRYDUM Sargan d.f. 
BANK 
models 
0.781 (0.00)                   30.60 31 
0.784 (0.00)       -0.079 (0.10)           22.12 30 
0.787 (0.00)         -0.026 (0.00)         29.76 32 
0.773 (0.00)           0.006 (0.00)       25.82 32 
0.774 (0.00)             -0.233 (0.00)     30.09 32 
0.756 (0.00)       0.135 (0.25) -0.006 (0.61) 0.012 (0.00) -0.361 (0.00)     19.22 33 
0.753 (0.00)       0.132 (0.22) -0.004 (0.78) 0.012 (0.00) -0.374 (0.03) 0.078 (0.00)   18.81 34 
0.758 (0.00)       0.136 (0.24) -0.002 (0.81) 0.012 (0.00) -0.369 (0.00)   0.087 (0.39) 19.68 34 
EQUITY 
models 
  0.753 (0.00)                 31.31 31 
  0.704 (0.00)     0.099 (0.01)           23.44 30 
  0.750 (0.00)       0.008 (0.00)         31.32 32 
  0.748 (0.00)         0.001 (0.03)       23.78 32 
  0.750 (0.00)           0.083 (0.00)     27.37 32 
  0.690 (0.00)     0.162 (0.00) 0.043 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) -0.302 (0.00)     23.91 33 
  0.684 (0.00)     0.141 (0.01) 0.043 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) -0.308 (0.00) 0.249 (0.00)   23.20 34 
  0.723 (0.00)     0.129 (0.02) 0.024 (0.03) 0.002 (0.00) -0.168 (0.00)   -0.377 (0.00) 24.19 34 
BOND 
models 
    0.356 (0.00)               29.68 31 
    0.282 (0.00)   0.110 (0.00)           23.01 30 
    0.348 (0.00)     0.005 (0.18)         29.40 32 
    0.361 (0.00)       0.002 (0.00)       27.89 32 
    0.344 (0.00)         -0.044 (0.10)     28.19 32 
    0.231 (0.00)   0.170 (0.00) 0.048 (0.00) 0.002 (0.03) -0.273 (0.00)     24.86 33 
    0.210 (0.00)   0.167 (0.00) 0.045 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) -0.273 (0.00) 0.132 (0.00)   25.83 34 
    0.232 (0.00)   0.169 (0.00) 0.048 (0.00) 0.002 (0.03) -0.262 (0.00)   0.014 (0.82) 25.62 34 
INTERN 
models 
      1.001 (0.00)             21.68 31 
      1.060 (0.00) 0.242 (0.03)           14.96 30 
      1.010 (0.00)   0.031 (0.03)         21.77 32 
      1.023 (0.00)     -0.007 (0.00)       20.52 32 
      1.009 (0.00)       0.261 (0.00)     20.17 32 
      1.047 (0.00) 0.175 (0.28) 0.047 (0.00) -0.009 (0.01) -0.233 (0.18)     15.24 33 
      1.035 (0.00) 0.169 (0.27) 0.047 (0.00) -0.010 (0.00) -0.215 (0.20) -0.286 (0.00)   15.35 34 
      1.014 (0.00) 0.159 (0.31) 0.042 (0.00) -0.009 (0.00) -0.186 (0.28)   -0.240 (0.58) 15.36 34 
Note: Sargan denotes the test for validity of instruments (instruments are the second lags of corporate financing variables). The numbers in parentheses are p-
values. 
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Table 4: GMM estimation results excluding non-Euro EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK(-1) EQUITY(-1) BOND(-1) INTERN(-1) BMY ER IR OPEN Sargan d.f. 
BANK 
models 
0.797 (0.00)               22.83 31 
0.796 (0.00)       -0.222 (0.00)       15.16 26 
0.803 (0.00)         -0.120 (0.00)     21.79 32 
0.773 (0.00)           0.010 (0.00)   20.62 32 
0.787 (0.00)             -0.371 (0.00) 20.61 32 
0.711 (0.00)       -0.213 (0.00) -0.366 (0.00) 0.029 (0.00) -0.782 (0.00) 14.81 29 
 
EQUITY 
models 
  0.844 (0.00)             31.23 31 
  0.826 (0.00)     0.043 (0.00)       12.35 26 
  0.841 (0.00)       0.058 (0.00)     29.47 32 
  0.836 (0.00)         0.003 (0.00)   19.62 32 
  0.836 (0.00)           -0.106 (0.00) 20.27 32 
  0.749 (0.00)     0.427 (0.00) 0.340 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00) -0.686 (0.00) 14.56 29 
 
BOND 
models 
    0.303 (0.00)           23.40 31 
    0.227 (0.00)   0.056 (0.01)       16.66 26 
    0.302 (0.00)     0.035 (0.00)     26.17 32 
    0.264 (0.00)       0.003 (0.00)   23.16 32 
    0.298 (0.00)         -0.075 (0.00) 22.21 32 
    0.018 (0.00)   0.371 (0.00) 0.260 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00) -0.627 (0.00) 17.74 29 
INTERN 
models 
      1.024 (0.00)         20.56 31 
      1.044 (0.00) 0.325 (0.00)       14.44 26 
      1.031 (0.00)   0.078 (0.00)     23.78 32 
      1.015 (0.00)     -0.010 (0.00)   19.75 32 
      1.022 (0.00)       0.305 (0.00) 19.37 32 
      1.004 (0.00) 0.502 (0.00) 0.291 (0.00) -0.016 (0.00) -0.060 (0.66) 12.60 29 
Note: Sargan denotes the test for validity of instruments (instruments are the second lags of corporate financing variables). The numbers in parentheses are p-
values. 
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Table 5: GMM estimation results for five EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK(-1) EQUITY(-1) BOND(-1) INTERN(-1) BMY ER IR OPEN Sargan d.f. 
BANK 
models 
0.839 (0.00)               22.02 31 
0.818 (0.00)       0.070 (0.00)       13.91 27 
0.841 (0.00)         -0.004 (0.00)     21.08 32 
0.852 (0.00)           0.001 (0.00)   20.23 32 
0.817 (0.00)             -0.140 (0.00) 17.19 32 
0.826 (0.00)       0.090 (0.01) 0.015 (0.15) 0.001 (0.00) -0.009 (0.32) 14.44 30 
 
EQUITY 
models 
  0.629 (0.00)             24.60 31 
  0.569 (0.00)     0.140 (0.00)       15.83 27 
  0.624 (0.00)       0.063 (0.00)     23.86 32 
  0.634 (0.00)         0.001 (0.00)   19.07 32 
  0.628 (0.00)           0.040 (0.00) 19.21 32 
  0.547 (0.00)     0.275 (0.00) 0.200 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) -0.287 (0.00) 15.41 30 
 
BOND 
models 
    0.544 (0.00)           18.86 31 
    0.472 (0.00)   0.075 (0.00)       16.37 27 
    0.532 (0.00)     0.035 (0.00)     19.09 32 
    0.571 (0.00)       0.001 (0.00)   18.62 32 
    0.546 (0.00)         0.001 (0.85) 18.15 32 
    0.406 (0.00)   0.144 (0.00) 0.108 (0.00) 0.002 (0.00) -0.171 (0.00) 17.47 30 
INTERN 
models 
      0.794 (0.00)         20.46 31 
      0.843 (0.00) -0.114 (0.02)       13.94 27 
      0.784 (0.00)   -0.096 (0.00)     19.25 32 
      0.846 (0.00)     -0.060 (0.00)   17.98 32 
      0.836 (0.00)       0.156 (0.00) 17.49 32 
      0.860 (0.00) -0.221 (0.00) -0.165 (0.00) -0.007 (0.00) 0.074 (0.52) 15.74 30 
Note: Sargan denotes the test for validity of instruments (instruments are the second lags of corporate financing variables). The numbers in parentheses are p-
values. 
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    Appendix 
 
    Table A.1: Panel unit root and stationarity tests: Results excluding non-Euro EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK EQUITY BOND INTERN 
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)          
Levin, Lin & Chu -1.49589  0.0673 -0.89357  0.1858 -8.44002  0.0000 -0.11152  0.4556 
Breitung t-stat -4.01631  0.0000 -1.05775  0.1451 -4.72845  0.0000 -1.12894  0.1295 
                  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)          
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  -3.02376  0.0012 -1.00445  0.1576 -8.2134  0.0000 -1.08854  0.1382 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square  29.4868  0.0033  14.5715  0.2657  80.4060  0.0000  14.5814  0.2651 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square  23.1257  0.0267  13.9236  0.3056  63.9975  0.0000  12.1041  0.4374 
           
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)          
Hadri Z-stat  0.39561  0.3462  0.32403  0.3730  0.15628  0.4379  1.20426  0.1142 
Hadri 
Heteroscedasticity 
Consistent Z-stat  1.46572  0.0714  0.52801  0.2987  0.30316  0.3809  0.52862  0.2985 
                  
 
Note: See Table 2. 
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    Table A.2: Panel unit root and stationarity tests: Results for five EU countries, 1972-2004 
 
 BANK EQUITY BOND INTERN 
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic 
P-
value Statistic 
P-
value 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)          
Levin, Lin & Chu -1.55054  0.0605 -0.43768  0.3308 -4.68723  0.0000 -1.58974  0.0559 
Breitung t-stat -3.23386  0.0006 -1.5777  0.0573 -3.86892  0.0001 -1.95092  0.0255 
                  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)          
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  -3.12549  0.0009 -0.76531  0.2220 -4.29365  0.0000 -3.1005  0.0010 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square  38.0153  0.0000  14.9266  0.1348  38.5545  0.0000  29.8815  0.0009 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square  22.0669  0.0148  27.7755  0.0020  30.5764  0.0007  22.5056  0.0127 
           
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)          
Hadri Z-stat  3.72672  0.0001  0.57174  0.2838  1.40502  0.0800  1.36157  0.0867 
Hadri 
Heteroscedasticity 
Consistent Z-stat  1.46576  0.0714  1.53405  0.0625  1.45977  0.0722  2.05805  0.0198 
                  
 
 
Note: See Table 2. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1. See for example, Baele et al. (2004) and Guiso et al. (2004). 
 
2. The sample selection is driven by data availability. The chosen countries are the only ones for which sufficient data was available 
for the period studied. Data beyond 2004 was not available for most countries at the time of writing this paper. 
 
3. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2008) find evidence for income convergence across EU countries. 
 
4. We also tried to follow Maddala and Wu‟s (1999) suggestion of using bootstrap samples for the ADF Fisher-type test as it 
accommodates cross-sectional dependence between units. We used an Eviews (version 6) code developed by Jaqueson K. Galimberti 
which requires balanced data. Consequently we had to drop Finland and Italy from our sample as they did not have data for all years. 
We used 10,000 replications to generate the bootstrap test statistics (57.55881 for BANK, 33.58297 for equity, 56.82608 for 
BOND32.84334 for INTERN) and the p-values indicated that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at 1% level of 
significance for all four variables. 
 
5. We have experimented with other regulatory and policy change variables such as a dummy for the year 1993 (launch of a single 
European market) and 2000 (adoption of the FSAP) but the convergence results were qualitatively similar to those reported in the 
paper. Moreover we controlled for structural breaks in the series (detected by Andrews-Quandt tests for unknown break points) but 
once again the convergence results were qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
